INTRODUCTION
001

Il! PHOFESSOR DR, SIGM. FREUD
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ans present volume of Dr, Varendonck’s contains & signifi-
003cant novelty, und will justly mouse the interest of all
004 philosophers, psychologists and psycho-analysts. After an
005 eflort lasting f some years the author has sucoeeded in
006 getting hold of the mode of thuught- activity to which one
007 abandons onesel during the state of distmction into which
008 we readin pass before sleep or upon incomplete nwakening.j‘
009 He has brought to the consciousness the chains of thought
010 originating in these conditions without the interi'erenoe of the
011 will; he has written them down, studied their peculiaritics
012 sind differences with directed conscious thinking, and has
013 made thereby a. series of important discoveries which lead
014 to still vnster problems and give rise to the formulation of
015 still more far-renohing questions. Many n point in the
016 psychology of the dream and the defective. act finds, thanks
017 to the observations of Dr. Varendonck, n. trustworthy
018 settlement.
019

It is not my intention to give a review of the nuthor’s
020 results. I will content myself with painting to the signifi-
021cance of his work and will permit myself only a remark con-
022cerning the terminology which he has adopted. He include:
023 the sort of thought-activity which he has observecl in
024 Bleulcr’s nutistic thinking, but calls it, M & rule, fon-
025wneniaus thinking, according to the custom preveilh&_in
026 psycho-annlysis. However, the autistic thiziking of Bléuler
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10 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DAY-DREAMS
031

does not hy any means eorrespond with the extension und
032 the contents of the fore—conseious, neither can I ndniit that
033 the name used by Bleuler has been happin chosen. The
034 designution “fore-conscious ” thinking itself as a characteristie
035 nppears to me misleading und unsatisfactory. The point in
036 question is that the sort of thought—activity of which the
037 Well-known day-dream is an example—complete by itself,
038 developing a situation or im net that is being brought to
039 & close—constitutes the best and until now the only studied
040 example. This day-dreaming does not owe its peculiarities
041 to the circumstance that’it proceeds mostly fore-conseiously,
042 nor are the forms changed when it is accomplished consciously.
043 From another point of View We know also that even strictiy
044 directed refiection may be achieved without the eo-operation
045 of consoiousness, that is to say, fore—eonsciously. For that
046 reason I think it is advisable, when establ‘ßhing a distinction
047 between the different modes of thought-activity, not to utilize
048 the relation to eonseiousness in the first instance, and to
049 designete the day-dream, as well as the Chains of thought
050 studied by Varendonck, as freely wandering or phantastic
051 thinking, in opposition to intentionally directed reflection.
052 At the same time it should be taken into consideration
053 that even phantastie thinking is not invariahly in want of
054 an aim anal end-representations. '
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